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652 THE GREEN BAG
AN INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT
By AMos S. HERSHEY
T HE extreme desirability, if not theabsolute need for an International
Prize Court has long been admitted on all
sides. After a very thorough study of this
question, the Institute of International Law
at its Heidelberg session in 1887, adopted
a project for the organization and procedure
of such a court.'
This need was demonstrated anew during
the Russo-Japanese war when Russian prize
courts condemned and confiscated a num-
ber of neutral cargoes (including the, vessels,
in a few instances), on wholly insufficient
or illegal grounds. It is true that the Rus-
sian High Admiralty Court at St. Petersburg
reversed most of these decisions, either in
whole or in part (e.g., in the cases of the
Allanton, the Arabia, the Calchas, and the
Knight Commander); but this was only after
long delays and repeated protests on the
part of Great Britain and the United States.
The Second Peace Conference which met
at the Hague on June 15, 1907, had not been
in session more than ten days before two
projects 2 - one German and the other
British - for the establishment of an Inter-
national Prize Court had been submitted to
the second sub-committee of the First Com-
mission on Arbitration, presided over by
M. Bourgeois. At the first meeting of
this committee on June 25, M. Renault
(France), Sir Edward Fry (Great Britian),
and Professor Kriege (Germany), were
appointed as a comit6 d' examen to study and
report upon these proposals.
The British plan provided that each of the
Signatory Powers whose merchant marine
surpasses a total of 8oo,ooo tons should
1 For the text of this project, see Tableau
Ggngral de ' Institut de Droit Int., pp. 217-219,
sections ioo- io9 of the Reglement International
des Prises.
2 The texts of both projects were published in Le
Courier de la Conference, for June 28, 1907.
appoint a jurist and a substitute judge of
recognized competence in questions of mari-
time international law within three months
after the ratification of the agreement.
The right of appeal was confined to neutral
states and an appeal was only allowed after
a national prize court of last instance had
given its decision. The president of the
court, whose term was limited to one year,
was to be chosen in alphabetical order by
such powers as had the right to appoint
judges.
The German project, which was largely
based on the plan suggested by the Institute
of International Law referred to above,
provided that the court was to consist of
five members, two of whom were to be
admirals representing the belligerents. The
three remaining judges were to be selected
from the list of members of the Hague Tri-
bunal of Arbitration in a somewhat com-
plicated manner by three neutral powers,
and the court was only to be instituted after
the outbreak of war between two or more
states. The right of appeal was to belong
to neutral and belligerent individuals as well
as to neutral states, and might be made from
the decision of a national prize court of
first instance. The president was to be
elected by the court itself from among those
of its members who belonged to the Hague
Tribunal, and liberal provision was made
for the payment of the judges.
The advocates of the German plan claimed
that its advantages over the British scheme
were at least twofold. In the first place,
it provided for a direct appeal from national
prize courts of the first instance by injured
belligerent and neutral individuals instead
of merely by neutral states. Secondly, it
created a court ad hoc, composed partly of
admirals, in which belligerents would prob-
ably place greater confidence than in a
permanent body of international jurists.
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Theoretically, it might seem very desirable
to establish an International Prize Court
wholly composed of neutrals, but in practice
it seemed wise not to attempt too wide a
departure from present methods of ad-
judication. The transition from purely
belligerent to purely neutral prize courts had
perhaps better be made gradually.
The partizans of the British project main-
tained that its advantages were threefold:
"First, the court would consist (solely) of
expert juris-consults; secondly, it would be
established on an eminently neutral basis;
thirdly, it would be established in time of
peace and be secure from the influences of
passions and prejudices so easily 2 and widely
excited in time of war."
The discussions in committee which fol-
lowed revolved about the following points
were put in the form of a series of questions:
(i) Should an International Prize Court of
Appeal for the adjudication of maritime
prizes be instituted? (2) Should the juris-
diction of the court be confined to cases
arising between the belligerent state making
the capture and the state claiming that its
subjects had been injured by capture, or
should it extend directly to individuals
claiming to have been injured? (3) Should
this jurisdiction extend to all matters re-
lating to prizes or merely to captures in
which governments or neutral individuals
are interested? (4) When shall the role of
international jurisdiction begin? Should it
commence as soon as the national tribunals
of first instance shall have rendered their
decision upon the validity of the capture
or should it be deferred until a final sen-
tence shall have been obtained in the state
of the captor? (5) Should the court be
permanent or should it be instituted ad hoc
upon the outbreak of war? Other ques-
tions (6, 7, and 8) framed by the comit d'
examen related to the composition of the
1 See writer's letter from The Hague to the New
York Evening Post for July 20, 1907.
2 London Times (weekly) for June 28, 1907, p.
405.
court, principles of international law to be
applied, and the nature of the proof re-
quired in behalf of the claimant.
It was unanimously agreed that an Inter-
national Prize Court of Appeal was neces-
sary, although Mr. Tsudzuki, the first Jap-
anese delegate, expressed the hope that
before such a court be instituted, the Con-
ference would reach an agreement on the
codification of rules affecting prize cases.
In answer to the second and third ques-
tions, Baron Marshall von Bieberstein and
Professor Kriege of Germany urged that the
right of appeal should belong to individuals
rather than to states, inasmuch as the
action of the latter might be influenced by
political considerations. Moreover, before
championing the cause of its nationals, a
state should examine their claims in fact
as well as in law - a work which it is often
very difficult, if not impossible to accom-
plish. It would seem preferable that indi-
viduals themselves be required to prove the
validity of their claims before the Interna-
tional Court. War being a conflict between
states and not between individuals, the sub-
jects of belligerent states are entitled to
the same protection as are those of neutral
states. The majority of the members of
the committee seemed to agree with the
German attitude on these questions, even
Sir Edward Fry failing to advance any
arguments in favor of his contention that
neutral states alone should have the right
of appeal.
In answer to the fourth question the
German delegates argued that the appeal
should lie from a national court of first
instance on the ground that an appeal from
the highest national court might lead to
friction and loss of respect for the court in
case its verdict were quashed. It was also
urged that such a procedure would be long
and very onerous. But Sir Edward Fry,
maintained that all national instances should
be exhausted before having recourse to the
International Court.
Respecting the permanency and composi-
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tion of the court, opinions were very much
divided. Professor Kriege, although admit-
ting that permanence would give to the
court a more stable and judicial aspect,
argued that practical considerations were
opposed to it. Peace and not war is the
ordinary condition of humanity, and why
establish a permanent tribunal which dur-
ing long intervals would have nothing to
do? But M. Ruy Barbosa of Brazil ob-
served that permanence was necessary in
order to secure good judges. Temporary
judges are wanting in experience, impar-
tiality, and independence. He suggested
that they might devote their years of peace
and enforced leisure to the study of mari-
time law.
Professors Kriege and de Martens fav-
ored the admission of two admirals repre-
senting the opposing belligerent powers in
order to afford necessary information. They
would tend to neutralize each other and
the preponderance would in any case be on
the side of the jurists selected from the
Hague Tribunal. Mr Choate declared in
favor of the presence of two admirals acting
in a purely advisory capacity.
M. Barbosa was strongly, opposed to the
British idea of limiting the right of appoint-
ment of judges to states having a merchant
marine of over 8oo,ooo tons. This, he de-
clared, would be to submit the weak to the
justice of the strong and would substitute
another principle (adjudication?) for that
of arbitration. He suggested a grouping of
the smaller states in such a manner that
each group might possess the required
amount of tonnage.
M. Tcharikoff held the seventh question to
be most important and declared that Russia
reserved her opinion upon the scheme as a
whole until it had been decided what
principles of international law should be
applied by the court. It was generally
agreed that in the absence of conventions,
the ordinary rules of international law would
serve as a juristic base in the decision of
cases. Several delegates expressed the hope
that the conference itself would succeed in
establishing such rules in addition to those
that already existed, and that these might
serve as a basis of further development by
judicial decision.
In the meantime, the third and fourth
commissions of the conference addressed
themselves seriously to the work of formu-
lating rules of maritime law; but the task
proved to be too great and intricate for their
combined wisdom, and the results of their
labors seem meagre enough. Beyond certain
rules relating to "days of grace," the trans-
formation of merchantmen into warships,
the inviolability of mail matter at sea, the
exemption of coast fishing vessels, etc., very
little has thus far been accomplished in the
direction of formulating an authoritative
code of maritime law which might serve as a
juridical basis for the decisions of an Inter-
national Prize Court. Especially has there
been a total failure to agree upon definitions
of contraband and blockade, to prohibit the
sinking of neutral merchantmen, and to
abolish the right of the capture of private
enemy property at sea.
But in spite of these failures, partly through
private negotiation and partly as a result
of further discussion in committee, a pro-
ject for the establishment of an Inter-
national Prize Court was finally agreed upon
and submitted to the conference at its sixth
plenary session on September 21, 1907. It
was presented as a joint proposition from the
delegations of Germany, the United States,
France, and Great Britain, and was accom-
panied by a lucid and able report read by M.
Renault in the name of the comiM d'examen
of the second sub-committee of the First
Commission on Arbitration.
In submitting this project, M. Renault
explained why an International Prize Court
was necessary:
"The seizure of a neutral ship implies a
real or pretended violation of neutrality.
Adjudication seems in this case to be a
necessity instead of a concession as in the
case of the capture of enemy property. To
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whom shall this jurisdiction belong? In
fact, it is exercised by the captor.
"Rationally, the captor should play the
role of claimant in order to validate the
seizure and secure confiscation, whether of
the ship or cargo. But it is generally other-
wise -the one whose goods have been
seized is claimant and he must prove the
illegality of the capture.
"In fact, if one goes to the bottom of
things, one finds that the prize courts are
national tribunals which decide international
questions. They must apply the laws of
their country without inquiring whether
these laws do or do not conform to inter-
national law. That is to say, a state may
regulate as it wishes international relations
by its own laws or regulations. It is respon-
sible however, to other states for every
violation of the principles of the law of
nations, whether such violation be the result
of a defective legislation or jurisprudence, or
of arbitrary acts on the part of the govern-
ment or its agents."
This report goes on to say that "under
such circumstances, one should not be
astonished that the decisions of prize courts
have often given rise to well-founded com-
plaints." If the government to which
individuals make these complaints is
strong, it presents diplomatic claims which
may lead to international controversies.
In answer to the important question,
"What rules of law shall the new prize court
apply? " M. Renault said:
"If the law of maritime warfare were
codified, it would be easy to say that the
International Prize Court, like the national
tribunals, should apply international law,
but this is far from being the case. Upon
very many points of which some are of great
importance, the law of maritime warfare is
still uncertain, and each state formulates it
in accordance with its own ideas and
interests. In spite of the efforts made at the
present conference to diminish these in-
certitudes, it is impossible to conceal the
fact that very many . uncertainties still
remain. Hence there arises a serious
difficulty.
"It goes without saying that even in the
absence of a formal convention, we may
have a customary rule which is recognized
as the tacit expression of the will of states.
But what will happen if the positive law,
written or customary, is silent? The solu-
tion indicated by strict principles of judicial
reasoning do not appear doubtful. In de-
fault of an international regulation firmly
established, international adjudication will
apply the law of the captor.
"It is doubtless easy to object and say
that we shall thus have a law which is very
changeable, often very arbitrary and even
crude, and that certain belligerents will
abuse the latitude left them by the positive
law. This will be a reason for hastening its
codification in order to get rid of the gaps
and uncertainties of which complaint is
made.
"Nevertheless, after ripe reflection, we
believe that we should propose a solution
which is doubtless bold, but of a nature
seriously to ameliorate the practice of in-
ternational law. 'If rules generally recog-
nized do not exist, the court will decide in
accordance with the principles of justice and
equity.' 1 It will thus be called upon to
make law and to take account of other
principles than those applied by the national
prize courts whose decisions are challenged
before the International Court. We have
the confidence that the magistrates chosen
by the Powers will realize their high mis-
sion, and that they will act with modera-
tion and firmness. They will modify the
practice in the spirit of justice without
overthrowing it.
"Let us then accept a court composed of
magistrates charged with supplying the
deficiencies of positive law until the codifi-
cation of international law, effected by the
governments, simplifies their task." 2
1 Sec. 2 of Art. VII.
2 For a digest or summary of M. Renault's re-
port, see Le Courier de la Conference for Sept. io,
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Let us now examine the text 1 of the
"Project for a Convention for the Estab-
lishment of an International Prize Court."
Titre I consists of nine articles, and con-
tains "general provisions" relating to the
conditions under which, and the states and
individuals by whom, an appeal may be
made, and the kind of law which shall be
applied by the court.
Art. 3 provides that an appeal may be
made to the International Court from the
decisions of national tribunals: (i) When
these concern the property of neutral Pow-
ers or of neutral individuals; (2) When
they concern enemy property in cases (a)
of merchandise conveyed upon a, neutral
ship; (b) of an enemy ship captured in the
territorial waters of a neutral Power, pro-
vided the neutral Power has not made this
capture the subject of a diplomatic claim;
and (c) in case of a claim founded upon
the allegation that the capture has been
effected in violation of a provision of a
convention in force between the belligerent
Power or of a legal regulation issued by the
belligerent captor. An appeal against the
decision of a national tribunal may be based
upon the allegation that this decision is not
justified either in fact or in law.2
1907. There seems to be a contradiction between
the statement that "in default of an international
regulation firmly established, International Juris-
diction will apply the law of the captor," and the
assertion that "if rules generally recognized do not
exist, the court will decide in accordance with the
general principles of justice and equity." They
may perhaps be reconciled by a comparison with
Sections 2 and 4-5 of Art. VII of the Convention.
Secs. 4 and 5 of Art. VII read as follows: "If, in
conformity with Sec. 2c of Art. III, recourse is
founded upon a violation of a legal provision
ordained by the belligerent captor, the court
shall apply this provision.
"The court cannot take into consideration the
defects in the procedure enacted by the legisla-
tion of its belligerent captor in cases in which it is
of the opinion that the consequences would be the
contrary to justice and equity."
1 See the Courier de la Conference for Sept. 22,
Sept. 24, and Oct. 2, 1907.
2It thus appears that the right of appeal of a
Art. 4 provides that the right of appeal
may be exercised under prescribed condi-
tions: (i) By a neutral Power; (2) by a
neutral individual; (3) by an individual
dependent upon an enemy Power.
Art. 6 declares that the right of jurisdic-
tion of national tribunals cannot be exer-
cised in more than two instances. "The
legislation of the belligerent captor shall
determine whether appeal is open after a
decision has been given by a Court of Appeal
or the Supreme Court. In case the national
tribunals have failed to give a final decision
within two years from the date of capture,
the Court may be directly seized of the
case."
Art. 7 provides that in the absence of
conventions or national legislation, the
court shall apply the rules of international
law. If generally recognized rules do not
exist, the Court shall decide in accordance
with the general principles of justice and
equity." Justice and equity shall even be
applied in cases where the rules of proceed-
ure enacted by the belligerent captor is
defective.
According to Art. 9, "the Signatory
Powers agree to submit in good faith to the
decisions of the International Prize Court
and to execute them with as little delay as
possible."
Titre II deals with the organization of the
court in seventeen articles. The Signatory
Powers agree within six months after the
date of ratification of the Convention, to
appoint judges and substitutes for these
judges who shall be "juris-consults of
recognized competence in questions of inter-
national maritime law." The term of
appointment for both classes is for six years
and they may be reappointed. The judges
are equal and enjoy diplomatic privileges,
but shall rank in accordance with the dates
belligerent is limited, whereas that of a neutral is
unlimited. As M. Renault remarks, a belligerent
can never ground an appeal on a "violation of a
rule of customary law or of a general principle of
the law of nations."
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at which their appointments are notified to
the Administrative Council at The Hague.
In case this date is the same for several
judges, seniority of age shall determine
precedence. The titulary judges shall take
precedence over the substitutes. (Arts.
10-14.)
The court shall consist of fifteen judges of
-whom nine shall constitute a quorum. If a
judge is absent, he shall be replaced by his
substitute. Art. 15 provides that the fol-
lowing eight Great Powers shall always be
entitled to a seat in the Tribunal: Germany,
the United States, Austria-Hungary, France,
Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia.
"The judges and substitutes shall be ap-
pointed by the other Powers in rotation in
accordance with the list 1 annexed to the
present Convention. Their functions may
be exercised by the same person. The same
judge may be appointed by several of the
said Powers."
"If a belligerent Power, according to the
-system of rotation, has no judge sitting in
the court, it may require that the judge
which it has appointed shall participate in
the trial of all cases arising out of the war.
In this case it shall be decided by lot which
of the judges whose turn it is to sit shall
withdraw. But the judge appointed by the
,other belligerent shall not be excluded."
(Art. 16.)
No one can sit as judge who has in any
way taken part in the decision of the case or
who has been counsel or advocate for one of
the parties in the national courts; and no
judge may act as agent or advocate before
the International Court during his term of
office. (Art. 17.)
Art. 18 embodies in modified form certain
features of the original German project
referred to ii the first part of this article.
'This list has unfortunately not as yet been
published in accessible form. The principle of
-rotation will be applied to the smaller states, i. e..
the judge of one state will, at the end of a specified
time, be succeeded by a judge representing another
:state.
"The belligerent captor has the right of
appointing a naval officer of high rank who
shall sit in the character of an assessor with
advisory functions. The same right belongs
to the neutral Power, which is a party to the
litigation or to the Power whose nationals
are parties to the dispute. If, in accordance
with this latter provision, there are several
interested Powers, they should agree, if
necessary by lot, upon the officer to be
appointed.
"Every three years the court shall elect its
president and vice-president by an absolute
majority of votes. After the second ballot
the election shall be by relative majority.
In case of an equal division of votes, the
selection shall be made by lot." (Art. ig.)
Art. 2o provides for the payment of the
judges. They shall receive though the
International Bureau at the Hague one
hundred florins per diem during the exercise
of their functions, together with an in-
demnity for their travelling expenses. As
members of the court they are not to receive
any remuneration from their own govern-
ment or from any other Power. They shall
sit at The Hague and can only sit elsewhere,
unless forced to do so, with the assent of the
belligerent parties. (Art. 21.)
Arts. 22' and 23 relate to the duties of the
Administrative Council and International
Bureau at The Hague, the latter of which
is to keep the archives and serve as a record-
office. The court shall decide which lan-
guage or languages may be used; but "in
all cases, the official language of the national
tribunals which have taken cognizance of the
case, may be used before the court." (Art.
24.)
Titre III deals in twenty-two articles with
the procedure of the court. Most of these
are comparatively unimportant except to
the interested parties and may be omitted
here. The most interesting and important
is perhaps Art. 43, which prescribes that the
deliberations of the court shall be secret,
although "the discussions are public unless
a litigant Power asks for secrecy." (Art. 39.)
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"All decisions shall be by a majority of
the judges present. If an even number of
judges is sitting and the votes are equally
divided, the vote of the last of the judges in
the order of precedence (see Sec. i of Art.
12) is not to be counted." (Art. 43.) The
verdict of the court must be pronounced in
public and be accompanied by a statement
of reasons; it must mention the names of
the judges who have participated in the
decision, and be signed by the president
and the clerk of the court. (Arts. 44 and
45.)
Each party defrays the costs of its coun-
sel. The losing party has also to pay the
cost of the proceedings; and, in addition,
to turn over one-hundredth of the value of
the object of litigation as a contribution to
the general expenses of the court. A de-
posit is required as a guarantee from a
private individual. (Art. 46.)
The general expenses of the court will be
borne by the Signatory Powers in propor-
tion to their participation in its action as
contemplated by Article 15 and the an-
nexed list (Art. 47.)
When the court is not in session its func-
tions will be exercised by a cbmmittee of
three judges designated by the Court. (Art.
48.)
This project was adopted by the Confer-
ence on September 12, 1907, by a vote of
thirty-seven votes against one, with six
abstentions. The only state directly voting
in the negative was Brazil who was dissat-
isfied with her share in the appointment of
the judges. The abstaining states were
Japan, Russia, Turkey, Siam, San Domingo,
and Venezuela. Japan and Russia appear
to think that the establishment of an In-
ternational Prize Court should be preceded
by a codification of maritime law- an
opinion which seems to be shared by a
large and influential section of the British
public.' Indeed, it is very doubtful whether
public opinion in England, which is
extremely jealous of belligerent rights and
British naval supremacy, will ever permit
the ratification of the Convention.
Ten Powers - China, Chile, Columbia,
Cuba, Equador, Guatamela, Haiti, Persia,
San Salvador, and Uruguay - entered res-
ervations concerning Article 15, which pro-
vides for the nomination of judges and a
scheme of rotation for the smaller states.
It will thus be seen that this project lacks
that unanimity or even general consensus
which is supposed to be necessary (or at
least desirable) in support of principles or
usages of international law. Two impor-
tant Powers - Japan and Russia - have
withheld their assent, and a considerable
number of the smaller states seriously
object to the way in which the court is
constituted. It is doubtful whether the
British House of Lords will consent to en-
act the legislation which is needed to carry
the Convention into effect, or whether the
American Senate can be induced to ratify
it. Whatever our prepossessions in favor
of such a court may be, the fact must be
faced that the majority of its members will
be jurists who have been trained in the
continental school of international juris-
prudence, and that they are not likely to
treat Anglo-American views and decisions
on maritime law with that respect and
veneration which we have been taught to
think they deserve.
BLOOMINGTON, IND., October, 1907.
1 See, e.g. letter of Professor Holland to the
London Times, republished by the Courier de la
Conference on Sept. 24, 1907; editorial entitled
"Pas de code naval, pas de Cour des Prises in the
Courier for Sept. 7, 1907; a very remarkable
editorial in the London Times for Sept. 30, 1907,
and editorial in the London Spectator for Oct. 5,
1907.
